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When Cash Is "Hot-Wired" For Fraud
By: Ron Marden and Dwayne McSwain
Abstract
Dave Martin. a CIA and CPA with three years of auditing experience with a small public accounting firm, had just 
started his new job with Conklin-Sterns Manufacturing (CSM) as an internal auditor. This position was new for both 
Dave and Conklin. CSM had recently created the internal auditing position upon the recommendation of its 
external auditors, a large regional CPA firm that has been doing CSM's audit for the past six years. The new 
internal audit position was created with the internal auditor reporting directly to the board of directors and
reporting administratively to the vice president for operations. Dave had plans to first create a charter for the 
internal auditing "department." Although there was only one internal auditor at this time, he had visions of 
growing the department over time as the value of his services were proven to the board. However, when Dave 
arrived for his first full day, he was greeted by Bert Holmes, the vice president for operations. It seemed Bert had 
already identified several areas of concern, with one issue being most pressing. He was not comfortable with the 
current state of control over some of the processes and, in particular, had an uneasy feeling about the "true" cash 
count.
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(CSM) as an internal auditor. This posi­
tion was new for both Dave and Con­
klin. CSM had recently created the 
internal auditing position upon the rec­
ommendation of its external auditors, a 
large regional CPA firm that has been 
doing CSM's audit for the past six years. 
The new inilernal audit position was cre­
ated with the internal auditor reporting 
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ment.'' Although there was only one inter­
nal auditor at this time, he had visions 
of growing the department over time as 
the value of his services were proven lo 
the board. However, when Dave arrived 
for his first full day, he was greeted by 
Bert Holmes, the vice president for oper­
ations. It seemed Bert had already iden­
tified several areas of concern, with one 
issue being most pressing. He was not com­
fortable with the current state of control 
over some of the processes and, in par­
ticular, had an uneasy feeling about the 
"true" cash count. 
Dave followed Bert to his office and 
then listened as Bert talked about the 
internal auditor's job responsibilities. 
Bert said that Dave would have three 
main areas of responsibility: perform­
ing operational audits of the manufac­
turing process, auditing the various 
accounting functions of the company, 
and acting as a liaison with the external 
auditors. Bert asked Dave to grab a cup 
of coffee with him before giving Dave a 
tour of the facilities and introducing 
him to CSM's employees. One of the first 
employees Dave was to meet was Marge 
Smith, a pleasant, elderly woman who 
was a CPA and CSM's head accountant. 
Marge supervised three bookkeepers 
who had very little accounting experi­
ence. Bert introduced the two and proudly 
stated that Marge not only took care of 
all the accounting but had worked for 
CSM for nearly I 4 years and was considered 
one of the hardest workers in the firm. 
In fact, she was frequently kidded by co­
workers as a "workaholic" because she 
hadn't missed a day of work or even taken 
a vacation leave in more than five years. 
Marge kindly welcomed Dave to the com­
pany and said she looked forwar-d to see­
ing him around. Afterward, Bert walked 
Dave through the different departments 
of the company, introducing him to other 
employees and providing an overview 
of the operations in each area. 
Finally settling into his office, Dave 
decided to write down his understand­
ing of the CSM's overall operations. 
While writing his narrative, he drafted 
a flowchart of the operations. Dave then 
remembered that the external auditors 
would have already documented the com­
pany's internal controls, so he called the 
partner-in-charge, explained his situa­
tion, and asked for copies of the work­
papers. The partner said that Dave was 
welcome to come and review the work­
papers at the firm's office, and that he could 
make copies of what he wanted as long 
as the originals stayed in the office. Dave 
agreed and made this his top priority 
for day two. 
As Dave studied the external auditors' 
workpapers, one finding jumped out at 
him and seemed to be unresolved or 
unaddressed. Dave was aware that CSM 
bought its raw materials from a number 
of firms overseas and ultimately sold the 
end product both nationally and inter­
nationally. To expe·dite these transac­
tions, many of the purchases and sales 
were conducted using wire transfers, 
This made Dave's professional skepti­
cism go on high alert since the external 
auditors had found the controls over 
wire transfers to be somewhat lacking. 
It seemed tbere was no segregation of 
duties. This was Marge's area. and she 
was responsible for all incoming and 
outgoing wires, overseeing the book­
keeping with the daily journal entries, 
and reconciling the wire transfer clear­
ing accounts. Given that Bert was par­
ticularly concerned over the cash account, 
Dave believed th is was an area needing 
further investigation. 
Dave remembered how Marge had not 
missed a workday or taken a vacation in 
more than five years. Initially, this might 
seem like a good trait, but now Dave was 
not so sure. Dave recalled an Institute of 
Internal Auditors conference on internal 
controls that had promoted employee 
cross-training and mandatory vacations 
as one of the ways to help prevent fraud. 
He remembered hearing that employees 
sometimes do not take vacations because 
they do not want anyone to sit in on their 
jobs and discover their schemes. 
Dave wanted to discuss his concerns 
with Bert, but was not sure how Bert 
might react.After all, Dave had just started 
work and Marge was a long-time, faith­
ful employee. So, he continued working 
on his own narrative -and flowcharts by 
starting with what the external auditors 
had. He felt this would be a good way to 
gain a more in-depth understanding of 
CS M's system of controls, while pro­
viding an impetus for taking corrective 
action. 
Dave carried internal control ques­
tionnaires as well as copies of the exter­
nal auditor's documentation to each 
department and told the employees what 
he was trying to accomplish. He asked 
for their help in updating the narrative 
and flowcharts, and he also asked for 
copies of all forms used. Upon receiving 
the requested feedback from each depart­
ment, Dave created his own documen­
tation of internal controls. Then, he took 
his new documents to each department 
and interviewed the employees to clear 
up any misunderstandings he may have 
had. Employees were more than willing 
to help and seemed somewhat excited 
that someone was taking an interest in 
what they were doing. 
During this time, Dave decided to dig 
deeper in to his suspicions abo,ut Marge 
and analyze the wire transfers for the 
past several years. Since CSM had con­
tracts with numerous firms it <lid busi­
ness with, Dave requested and received 
an electronic file from CSM's bank that 
detailed all of the company's wire trans­
fer activity for the past three years. Dave 
also requested two transaction files from 
Bert. One of Bert's files contained the 
daily cash transactions, and the other 
contained the transactions for the wire 
control accounts. Using a popular data 
extraction software program to compare 
transaction dates, Dave discovered at 
least a day's lag, and sometimes more, 
between CSM's booking of incoming 
wires to the clearing accounts and the 
third parties' records. Was Marge "lap­
ping" wire transfers? This was a possi­
bility because CSM had a policy of not 
putting a temporary hold on wired funds 
in order to provide customers with imme­
diate shipping on sales and might explain 
why they had not complained. 
Dave knew he had to report his find­
ings to Bert and eventually to the board 
of directors: however, he wanted to inves­
tigate further to substantiate his initial 
findings. Armed with his new internal. 
control documentation, Dave went back 
to visit Marge. Reviewing the document 
flowchart, Marge explained to Dave that 
all wire requests received after 2 p.m. 
went into the next day's business and 
would naturally have a later transaction 
date when posted. Dave agreed with 
Marge about the cutoff for outgoing wire 
transfers, but then he pressed her about 
incoming wires being post-dated. Marge 
said the reason for post-dating these 
transactions was because the third-party 
processing bank did not always credit 
CSM on the transaction date. Dave knew 
this was not true but did not confront 
Marge or indicate that he knew the truth, 
Dave wrote a formal .report that was 
to be given to the board of directors 
describing his findings. But first, Dave 
made an appointment with Bert for an 
exit review to discuss his findings and 
to give Bert an opportunity to address. 
the issue and share his insight about th.e 
report. Initially, Bert seemed shocked, but 
he went on to say that somehow he was 
not surprised. He already had a gut feel­
ing that something was amiss, but until 
now he did not have any proof. Bert was 
pleased with one of Dave's recommen­
dations, which suggested that CSM add 
one week of mandatory vacation for a.ll 
employees. Bert added that Marge could 
be the first to take vacation and justify 
it since she hadn't taken a day off in 
many years. Bert and Dave discussed the 
matter at length and wondered what else 
they should do about Marge. After all, 
Marge's reputation as a sweet, grand­
motherly type would go a long way with 
most of the board members. 
Based on his meeting with Bert, Dave 
reserved a spot on the agenda for the 
next board meeting to discuss his find­
ings. Dave made sure his report was 
included in the agenda packet that com­
mittee members normally received the 
week prior to their meeting. 
Upon receipt of the committee agenda 
and Dave's report, the board chair did­
n't wait and called an emergency meet­
ing for early the next morning. The chair 
asked Bert to be present when Dave made 
his report. Presenting his report, Dave 
specifically recommended several uni­
versal rules for achieving internal con­
trol over wire transfers: 
l. Do not permit any one employee to
handle a transaction from beginning
to end, emphasizing the separation
of duties.
2. Keep information safe. Shred docu­
mentation with account information
on it and do not automate passwords
and other critical information.
3. Record transactions promptly.
4. Encourage customers to obtain
receipts.
5. Have account reconciliations pre­
pared by employees not responsible
for wire transactions and check bal­
ances carefully. 
6. All wire transfers must be supported
by proper documentation.
7. If over a designated amount, allow
transfers only with two authorized
signatures, not one.
8. If you send wire transfers regularly,
have the bank transfer agents set up
text-message alerts to the CFO or
other responsible officer for trans­
fers sent over a certain amount.
9. All employees should be required to
take at least one week of vacation
annually.
Dave went on to suggest that a log of
all wire transfers be kept daily, with a copy 
of the list being maintained by an assigned 
head wire transfer- clerk and the origi­
nal, with the appropriate journal entries, 
bein,g sent to a separate bookkeeper. This 
bookkeeper would check the journal 
entries for completeness and accuracy by 
verifying the account codes and recal­
culating the ins-and-outs listed on the 
log. The entries, with supporting backup, 
would be forwarded to the vice presi­
dent for operations for approval. Once 
approved, the head accountant would 
assign another bookkeeper to key the 
entries, cancel the documents by stamp­
ing them with the keyed date, and file the 
documents by date. Monthly, the vice 
president for operations or bis designee 
would reconcile the wire transfers to a 
list of wire transfer activity received 
directly from the bank. 
Impressed with his professionalism 
and willingness to look after the com­
pany's interest with such sensitivity, the 
board approved a mandatory vacation pol­
icy, effective immediately. Bert told the 
committee that he would let Marge know 
that day that she would be on vacation 
starting tomorrow. 
W'hile Marge was on vacation, Dave com­
pleted his first official audit for CSM. 
He found that during the last several 
years Marge had managed to embezzle 
more than $300,000 by"lapping" dozens 
of w.ire transfers. Additionally, she had 
been using wire transfers to directly pay 
for many of her personal expenses, such 
as credit cards that she used to buy cloth­
ing, jewelry, food, and other expenses. 
Since she was the head accountant, Marge 
had instructed her subordinates to make 
numerous fraudulent entries into CSM's 
accounting record.s to make it seem like 
these payments were legitimate business 
transactions. The three bookkeepers that 
worked for Marge were young and inex-
perienced and simply took Marge's word 
for authenticity. They were also careful 
to follow orders since Marge had the 
influence to have them fired. 
Dave had a subsequent meeting with 
the full board of directors to present his 
findings. The matter was promptly turned 
over to the authorities where Marge was 
subsequently convicted of theft and bank 
fraud and given a different kind of man­
datory vacation-five years in federal 
prison. Marge was. also ordered to make 
restitution but had few assets to show for 
the money she had sto1en. Justice might 
have been served, but CSM was not likely 
to ever recover the embezzled money. 
As illustrated with this case, the inter­
nal auditing function may be one of the 
most important areas of oversight and 
control that a company can have. Preventive 
and detective controls a company might 
consider in this area are: organizing the 
separation of duties (which CSM has 
now done by installing a better system 
of checks and balances); adopting a ver­
ification process (CSM now has Bert 
review and approve all wire transfers); 
using terminal security features (only 
the head wire transfer clerk can access 
the CSM dedicated wire transfer termi­
nal); and appointing a security supervisor 
(Dave will now be auditing all CSM wire 
transfers on a monthly basis). 
The lessons CSM learned from its mis­
guided trust in an employee, lack of con­
trols, and unresponsiveness to the 
external auditors' warnings were costly. 
Wire transfer fraud can wipe out a firm's 
cash account with the push of a button; 
it's nearly undetectable without proper 
controls and at times even untraceable. 
CSM was fortunate to have the wherewithal 
to finally install a.n internal audit func­
tion and find an internal auditor such as 
Dave. • 
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